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Introduction
This paper is on Brazilian multilateral commercial diplomacy first in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), between 1947 and 1964, then in the World
Trade Organization since 1995.  To consider this history from a Brazilian angle it was
often necessary to describe the development of multilateral negotiations from a wider
perspective given the  specificity which mark much of GATT and WTO diplomacy
and rules. The first section covers the 1947-1980 period and includes the early period,
dominated by negotiations of the GATT and of the Havana Charter, the first twenty
years of the GATT, and the Tokyo Round in the 1970’s. It also includes Brazilian
involvement in dispute settlement during this period. Section 2 analyses the
negotiations between 1980 and 1986, which preceded the launching of the Uruguay
Round. The third section is on the Uruguay Round. Section 4 considers Brazil’s
involvement in GATT dispute settlement actions between 1980 and 1984. The fifth
section is on Brazil and the WTO. Section 6 considers Brazilian long-term
commercial diplomacy in the GATT and the WTO. The final section is on the way
ahead, with particular emphasis on Brazil’s interests and likely role in future
multilateral trade and negotiations and in the working of the multilateral trading
system.
1. Brazil and the GATT, 1947-1980
Early years: GATT and ITO
Brazil was reasonably active in the negotiations which led to both the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 and to the still-born Havana Charter and
International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948
3. United States proposals on future
rules to govern world trade were presented to the United Nations and discussed and
modified after negotiations in which Brazil was one of the 17 countries represented.
The resulting document served as a basis for negotiation of the ITO charter in Havana.
In the meantime, as a provisional arrangement, a General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)as well as tariff concessions to be applied after 1948 were negotiated.
Brazil was also one of the 23 founding fathers of GATT.4
In Havana, Brazil was one of 56 countries represented in the ITO negotiations.
Brazilian central interests at the time included the opposition to preferential trade
agreements, the possibility to invoke quantitative restrictions due to balance of
payments difficulties, and the continued possibility to enforce both the compulsory
mixture of domestic and imported products and the discriminatory internal taxation of
imports.
4 Together with Australia, India and other developing economies it insisted in
the right to apply import quotas discriminating against different types of products. The
approved charter included a much diluted provision for the application of quantitative
restrictions based on “development reasons”. As the Havana Charter was not ratified
by the United States, the GATT, which had been thought as a provisional arrangement
to be absorbed into ITO’s charter, was transformed into the basic set of rules to
regulate commercial policies on a multilateral basis and was to survive until 1995 as
an ad interim committee of the International Trade Organization.
The essential provisions of GATT included the abolition of quantitative restrictions to
trade so that protection depended as far as possible only on tariffs; the universal
adoption of the most favoured nation clause so that bilateral trade concessions were to
be automatically extended to third countries; and the progressive reduction of tariff
barriers through the negotiation of reciprocal concessions in multilateral negotiation
rounds.
5 A concession was made when a contracting party enters into a commitment
that duties charged on a specific good will not exceed a specified level ( the tariff is
said to be bound at this level). From the point of view of the pure theory of
international trade tariffs reduce welfare, especially those imposed by small
economies, that is those unable to influence world prices. Protection is to be
essentially explained by political economy arguments: sectors with political clout are
able to extract rents from the rest of the economy. A successful multilateral trade
negotiation can be thought as involving the internal renegotiation of rent-extraction
protection in all contracting parties aiming at a reduction in the level of protection.
Important potential advantages from GATT membership, particularly for a small
economy, are related to the possible protection offered by its dispute settlement and
rule enforcement provisions as well as by the unconditional application of the most
favoured nation clause.5
The first 20 years: rich men’s club and free riders
Until the Kennedy Round of multilateral negotiations (1963-1967), exchange of
concessions in the GATT were mostly between developed economies. Some see the
developing countries as free riders as tariff reductions were multilateralized by the
MFN clause and there was very little involvement of developing countries. Others see
the GATT as a richmen’s club geared exclusively to meet the interests of developed
economies as tariff concessions were mainly irrelevant for developing economies
without supply response.
6
Dissatisfaction with the GATT among developing countries made possible the
relaxation of rules on the application of quantitative restrictions invoking balance of
payments difficulties. In Brazil, indeed, tariffs became unimportant as a measure of
protection as import controls were introduced after mid-1947 and exchange cover
auctions in 1953. In 1957 a new tariff was introduced and the renegotiation of the
Brazilian schedule of concessions with some of the trade partners lasted until the early
1960’s.
7 Restrictions based on balance of payments became the rule.
The most interesting initiative by Brazil in the GATT in the 1960’s was taken jointly
with Uruguay on nullification and impairment of obligation (article XXIII). It was
proposed that developed countries paid financial compensation to developing
countries for violation of rules. Developing countries could withdraw their GATT
obligations towards developed countries if the latter introduced measures affecting
their exports. The principle of collective retaliation as a last resort measure was also
proposed. But the initiative resulted in only minor changes in the dispute settlement
rules.
8
Developing countries concentrated their efforts in sidestepping the GATT in
negotiations which led to in 1964 to UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development) and to the preferential treatment of developing country exports in
the market of developed economies under the System of Generalized Preferences. In
1965, a Part IV was added to the General Agreement which mentioned the possibility
of non-reciprocal concessions between developed and developing contracting parties6
but remained a declaration of principles.
9 After much initial resistance the United
States agreed at the second UNCTAD in 1968 to support the creation of a Generalized
System of Preferences. The derogation at the GATT, required because it was a
violation of the MFN clause, was agreed in 1971 for ten years. With the shift in
economic policy after the military coup in Brazil in 1964, a tariff reform in 1967
reduced the level of protection, but this was reversed in 1969, and still more
markedly, after the oil shock of 1973-1974, which was followed by the re-adoption of
tight non-tariff import controls until the late 1980’s. So Brazil’s almost permanent
status was that of a country invoking Article XVIII:B of the General Agreement,
which allowed quantitative restrictions based on balance of payments difficulties.
Brazilian interest in the Kennedy Round, similarly to that of other developing
countries was rather limited. This assessment, based on the evaluation that
negotiations would continue to be dominated by the main developed economies, was
vindicated by the Round’s results: reduction in average tariffs for products of interest
for developing countries was of 20% while that on products interesting developed
economies was in the 35-40% range.
10
Brazil and the Tokyo Round
As negotiations in the UNCTAD became bogged down Brazil’s attention turned again
to GATT, and in particular to the Tokyo Round. This move was also partly prompted
by the rising barriers faced by exports of the more advanced developed economies in
the markets of the  developed  economies. In the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) there was
for the first time a clear clash between the more advanced developing countries such
as Brazil and the United States, seeking reciprocity in terms of concrete concessions.
In Brazil, the Ministry of Finance was against making any tariff reduction offer, a
clear indication of the imbalance between the strength of lobbies favouring continued
high protection and those seeking access to cheaper inputs and capital goods. Brazil
ended offering a list restricted to 200 products and made explicit its interest in
concessions for orange juice, beverages and processed meat. But little was obtained
by Brazil or other developing economies: tariff reduction of 33%, for products for
which  there was a special interest by developed economies, was again higher than the
26% cut affecting products of interest for developing economies.
117
For developing countries GATT codes and reform of the GATT system were more
important than tariff negotiations. Codes were designed to prevent free riding through
the adoption of a MFN clause restricted to specific signatories.
12  From the point of
view of the most important code was on subsidies due to importance of the US market
for Brazilian manufactured exports and to the Brazilian policy of export enhancement
based on special fiscal rebates besides those affecting indirect taxes. In spite of
resistance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the position of the Ministry of Finance
prevailed and Brazil was the first developing country to sign the Code on Subsidies
agreeing to freeze and  phase out these GATT-illegal subsidies.
13  Other signatories of
the Subsidies Code such as India and Pakistan entered into much weaker
commitments.
 14
In the reform of the GATT system issue negotiations in the Framework
15 group took
as basis for discussion a Brazilian proposal which included: the provision of a legal
basis for the GSP so that preferences would be bound and their withdrawal subject to
compensation; further flexibility in the use of Article XVIII balance of payments
safeguards; modification in the dispute settlement mechanisms as well as definition of
right to non-reciprocity of developing countries. Developed economies had a special
interest in dispute settlement and limitations in the use of export controls. US policy
was to stress its reticence to allow the MFN clause to be relegated to a secondary role
– a surprising view if compared to the spirit of the codes which strongly undermined
Article I – and the expectation that trade preferences under the SGP would be
withdrawn when developing countries reached a certain level of development.
16
The main resulting agreements included the binding of the derogation which made
GATT-legal non-reciprocity based on special and differential treatment. Developing
countries in turn agreed to a quite general declaration that established the principle of
graduation which would make developing countries which reached a specific but
undefined development threshold to strengthen their commitment to GATT
obligations.
17
Brazil used the GATT’s dispute settlement mechanism only once in the 1970’s,
following Australia in its claim that  the EC system of payments to sugar importers8
violated Article XVI, causing the EC share of the world market to increase and
serious injury to other exporters. The panel found in Brazil’s favour but the matter
was closed by a change in the EC legislation.
2. Skirmishes before the Uruguay Round 1980-86
US interest in ‘new themes’ – services, intellectual property (TRIPS
18), investment
and trade (TRIMS
19) and high technology products – was clearly stated already in
1980.  Negotiations on these issues were thought to be potentially favourable to US
interests. GATT was also preferred as a negotiation venue if compared to some
specialized international agencies where US influence was more diffuse. Brazil, like
other relatively advanced developing economies, assumed a defensive stand in talks
which preceded GATT’s 1982 ministerial meeting, trying to obstruct the inclusion
TRIPS, TRIMS and, especially, services, in the provisional agenda of the next round
of multilateral negotiations. Opposition was based on fears that the inclusion of new
themes would divert attention from the GATT backlog, that is, of pending
negotiations on market access generally, but particularly from textiles and agriculture,
issues of special interest for most developing economies.
 20  
            In spite of the resistance by developing economies the 1982 GATT ministerial
declaration included a specific mention to the new themes.
21 The United States exerted
bilateral pressure to undermine the stand of specific countries. Brazil was in a
particularly vulnerable position due to the international financial crisis which
followed the Mexican crisis of August 1982. A bridge loan by the US Treasury to
Brazil was important to face  difficulties in the end of that year and the US also agreed
that Brazil postponed for two years its commitment to abolish GATT-illegal
subsidies. Brazil ended up by agreeing with the mention to services in the ministerial
declaration while stressing that this had no implications on its substantive stance on
the negotiation of the new themes. This volte face weakened the coalition of
developing economies opposing the inclusion of new tissues in the agenda.
22
The long negotiations which preceded the launching of the Uruguay Round in Punta
del Este in September 1986 were marked by  continuous divergences in relation to the
inclusion of the new issues, and particularly of services. More radical opposition9
originated in the so-called G-10 coalition of developing countries in which Brazil and
India played a prominent role.
23  The opposition was based in arguments which ranged
from the usual resistance to include in the GATT agenda issues, which had been
traditionally dealt with other agencies, to doubts arising from the lack of analytical
skills and negotiation experience  to deal with such new issues, and the asymmetrical
nature of advantages entailed by liberalization.
 24 The initial proposals also did not
include  themes of special interest of the developing economies such as international
mobility of labour, access to technology and regulation of the activities of
multinationals.
25 The draft ministerial declaration which competed with that of the G-
10 was prepared by the G-9 group composed of EFTA, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand. In June 1986, a group of 20, composed by developing  countries which did
not agree with the G-10 draft, started meeting with the G-9 and the outcome was the
Swiss-Colombian draft which was presented as a basis for negotiation in Punta del
Este in competition with the G-10 document.
26
3. The Uruguay Round, 1986-1994
27
The Swiss-Colombian draft was not, however, effectively supported by the European
Communities due to differing views on agricultural liberalization. The EC sought the
support of the G-10, or at least of Brazil and India, in the direction of a slowing down
in agricultural liberalization in exchange for its effort to refrain the US enthusiasm
with the new themes. There were also G-10 and EC common grounds to worry in
relation to US intentions to transform the traditional GATT consensus rule into
majority vote.
28
From the Brazilian point of view active interest in the Round, in principle, centered on
some of the old issues such as textiles, temperate agriculture tropical products, and
antidumping, subsidy countervailing duties and safeguards applied in export markets.
To the Brazilian government the advantages of avoiding concessions on the new
themes seemed to outweigh comfortably the benefits related to liberalization in the
traditional issues. This was due both to the agenda building process itself and to the
intrinsic difficulty in evaluating gains and losses by countries or sectional interests
within countries. There were, for instance, many doubts concerning the direction and
magnitude of the net gains from trade liberalization for Brazilian exports to the10
markets of developed economies, as for instance, textiles, as well as on the
differentiated impact of agricultural liberalization on specific products: soya, sugar,
wheat and beef. 
29
The declaration that launched the Uruguay Round reflected a compromise: new
themes such as TRIPS and TRIMS were treated as GATT issues from the start while
specific negotiations would be held simultaneously on services, but not within the
scope of GATT. Decision on the incorporation of the outcome of the services
negotiations in the GATT was thus postponed. For G-10 countries the division of
negotiations into two parts aimed at blocking cross concessions involving services and
the backlog of traditional issues. It was thought that it would be easier to block
concessions concerning services as the potential balance of concessions favoured the
developed economies.
Results of the first two years of negotiations were presented at Montreal in December
1988.
30 The US insisted that agricultural export subsidies should be totally phased out
in ten years. This could not be accepted by the EC, keen on maintaining a wedge
between internal and export agricultural prices. Argentina  reacted strongly to the
agricultural deadlock. The Latin American members of the Cairns group
31, pressed to
put results reached in negotiations in eleven other negotiation groups  on hold, subject
to agreement in all negotiations to be reached until April 1989. US support to this
position, after a sharp initial resistance, made possible to condition results in the
Round to progress in agriculture.
The inclusion of the principle of national treatment of foreign suppliers in the services
draft was a significant step forward in the negotiations and a substantial concession by
the more reluctant developing economies. The sectoral examination of concepts,
principles and rules was of great relevance for developed countries wishing to weaken
the relevance of concepts such as "increasing participation of developing countries"
and "regulatory situation" which could provide a basis for a reduction in the
involvement of developing economies in the negotiations.
32 The emphasis placed by
some developed economies on a  framework agreement on services seemed rather
weakened by the statement that before the approval of such an agreement, concepts,
principles and rules would be examined in relation to their applicability  to specific11
sectors and modalities of transaction to be covered by the framework agreement on
services.
33 The possibility of exclusion of certain sectors from the agreement also
made possible the participation of some of the developed economies which had
reservations, as for instance the US in relation to maritime transport.
The main results of interest for developing economies included increased access to
markets in the developed economies, including for tropical products, and also the
transformation of nontariff barriers in tariff protection, especially in agriculture.
Other results of interest included improvement in the dispute settlement mechanism
and working of the GATT system, in particular in strengthening its links with the
World Bank and the IMF  as well as in increasing the involvement of ministers in its
working programme.
34
In April 1989 the agricultural deadlock was broken when the US agreed that mention
should be made to substantial and progressive reductions in subsidies and domestic
support in the long term, thus agreeing that the EC would avoid an undertaking to
abolish such policies within a specified time frame. Since the difficulties on
safeguards were postponed by an agreement on the working programme of the
negotiating group, pressures were on developing countries given the polarization of
negotiations on textiles and TRIPS. The gap on TRIPS was substantial and
concentrated on whether the issue should be negotiated in the GATT or in the WIPO,
as India and Brazil insisted. As the Indian opposition weakened, the position of the
developed countries prevailed and the decision on whether GATT or WIPO would
enforce the relevant decision postponed. In the case of textiles there was an explicit
undertaking to dismantle the MFA (Multifibre Arrangement) and it was agreed that
within the Round’s time span a decision would reached on how the sector would be
incorporated into GATT.
35
In Brussels, in 1990, in the meeting that should have crowned the four years of
negotiation since Punta del Este, the failure of Montreal was repeated: the redefinition
of the US proposal (a cut of 75% in domestic support and 90% in export subsidies
over 10 years) still left it very far from the best the EC was reported as willing to offer
(a cut of around 30% in both cases, base 1986).
36 Again, the Cairns Group, and
especially its Latin American members, among which Brazil, was important to assure,12
after initial US resistance, that no agreement emerged without substantial advance in
relation to agriculture.
37 The US strategy of stressing the EC’s intransigence on
agriculture as the main reason for the failure of negotiations proved at least
temporarily correct.
 One year after the Brussels deadlock the GATT Secretariat circulated a document
which was deemed to reflect the results of the negotiations and could serve as a basis
for compromise.
38 Only offers related to the reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers
and initial undertakings in the liberalization of services were excluded. The crucial
issue at stake was the incorporation of agriculture in the GATT. Liberalization
undertakings were to include: reduction in support to domestic production;
improvement of market access; reduction in export subsidies. The proposed reduction
in domestic support was of 20%, base year 1986-1988. Non-tariff barriers would be
transformed into tariffs and these would be reduced on average by 36% in six years
(minimum 15%). Expenditures with subsidies were to be reduced by 36% and
quantities affected by 24%. Brazil had a special interest on the latter since its exports,
especially of soya products and poultry, were unfavourably affected by programmes
such as the US Export Enhancement Program. Special and differential treatment
would benefit developing countries either through a limitation of undertakings or an
extension of implementation periods. The main threat faced by Brazilian agricultural
exporting interests, however, was the menace by the EC to “rebalance”its agricultural
policy so as to adjust to the effects of liberalization.  This would entail tariff quotas on
products such as soya and molasses (6%) and soya products and citric pellets (12%)
applied to volumes equivalent to the 1986-1988 average. Beyond this threshold
equivalent ad valorem duties would be of 84% and 190%, respectively.
39     
The main proposals on anti-dumping referred to disciplines concerning the definition
of criteria to determine constructed prices, the relation between dumping and injury to
domestic production, to procedural steps to be taken in opening investigations and the
application of retroactive duties. Compensatory duties would be subject to a sunset
clause designed to limit its application unless the AD process was reviewed. Some
features concerning subsidy countervailing measures, such as sunset provisions, were
similar to those on AD.  Only “specific”subsidies, ie, those applied to specific
enterprises, industries or groups of enterprises of industries were to be subject to13
disciplines. Subsidies contingent on export performance and on the use of domestic
goods were to be prohibited.  “Actionable” subsidies were those which cause injury to
domestic industry of other signatories. Developing economies with a GNP per capita
of less than US$1,000 would have eight years to implement the new rules.  A sunset
clause would also apply to safeguards and  all voluntary export restraints or orderly
marketing arrangements or similar measures would be discontinued in four years with
one exception per country which will be allowed to continue until it is phased out in
31 December 1999. Safeguard measures are to be applied irrespective of sources and
consultations are envisaged to establish quota allocation among affected suppliers.
Safeguard shall not be applied against exports from developing countries unless
certain thresholds concerning market share by a given developing country or the
aggregate share of developing countries are exceeded.
Dismantlement of the MFA was planned to proceed slowly. In the beginning of phase
1 only 12% of the total volume of imports was to be taken out of the MFA and
integrated into the GATT. The inclusion of a further 4% was being negotiated. After
three years phase 2 would include a further 17%. After a further 4-year period, 18%
more of imports would be included into GATT. Ten years after the beginning of the
process all imports would be integrated into GATT. During phase 1 quota limitations
would increase at rates 16% higher than those under the MFA; under phase 2 quota
expansion rates were to be 25% higher than those under phase 1; in phase 3,  27%
higher than those in phase 2 .
 
The agreement on services included three essential elements: a set of basic obligations
by all signatories; national undertakings specifying additional liberalization schedules;
and a set of annexes dealing with exceptions and specific sectors. The scope of the
agreement included a variety of alternative modes of supply.  Exceptions to a general
MFN clause would be limited to ten years. In view of the importance of national
legislation there would be specific provisions related to transparency and form of
application. Commitments on market access and national treatment would be included
in national schedules. Progressive liberalization would result from successive
negotiation rounds. Specific annexes would regulate movement of labour, financial
services, telecommunications services and air-transport services. The annex on
services defined the rights of parties to take prudential measures, detailed obligations14
on market access and national treatment concerning the payments and clearing
systems operated by public entities as well as to official funding and refinancing
facilities. The annex of telecommunications centered on the access to and use of
public telecommunications services and networks.   Although the annex on air
transportation excluded traffic rights it included a wide scope of ancillary activities.
The focus of the draft agreement on TRIPS was on the effectiveness of such norms
and multilateral dispute settlement. The most important general principles included
national treatment and MFN. Protection standards were more stringent than those
established by the Bern and Paris conventions on the protection of literary and artistic
works and intellectual property as well as the Washington treaty on integrated
circuits; computer programmes and biotechnological developments would be
protected; indication of origin would be improved; a 20-year patent protection would
be available for almost all products and processes; additional obligations would be
created in relation to confidential information, anti-competitive practices and
licensing. Developing countries would have a 5-year transition period and least
developed countries eleven years. For products without previous patent protection this
protection would have to be introduced in ten years. Patenting procedures for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products in this case, however, would start
in the beginning of the transition period in order to preserve the novelty of the
invention and  the possibility of future use of the patent.
The draft on TRIMS listed measures inconsistent with national treatment and the
prohibition of quantitative restrictions in special related to national treatment and
balance of trade equilibrium.  The document also included parts related to rules of
origin, pre-shipment inspection, technical barriers, import licenses, customs valuation,
government procurement and working of the GATT system.
            Brazilian interest in access centered on the reduction of barriers in the developed
economies of tropical products and certain specific products such as orange juice. In
the Montreal meeting of 1988, offers by these economies on tropical products affected
total exports of US$ 14.9 billion, later improved in 1990 to US$ 22.7 billion. His
would correspond to an expansion of world trade in tropical products of only 3.3%
due to the concentration of offers on products already enjoying de facto free entry in15
developed country markets and the pre-existence of preferential schemes such as the
Lomé convention and the GSP. coffee. For Latin America cuts were concentrated in
the EC and mainly affected coffee and cocoa.
40 Offers for orange juice involved tariff
cuts of around 15-20%.
It was reported that the EC and the US had reached in the Blair House meeting in
Washington, D.C., at the end of November 1992, agreement both on a GATT
agricultural package and on their wrangles concerning oilseeds. There would be a
restriction of the sown area of oilseeds in the EC,  would limit the industrial use of
oilseeds, the EC would abandon its rebalancing plans and exports of beef by the EC to
Asia would be suspended.
41 Commitment to reduction of subsidized exports would be
reduced from the 24% cut in the Dunkel draft to 21%. This was the binding constraint
on export subsidies due to price changes since 1986 and would entail a reduction of
price incentives to producers of less than a sixth in six years. Direct payments to
producers would be excluded from the commitment to cut 20% of domestic support
since 1988. This was in any case not binding due to price changes in the meantime.
Reduction of sown area was in line with the targets of the Mac Sharry reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Liberalization would be concentrated on
products more affected by CAP reform: grains and seeds relatively more, beef only
modestly, and sugar and dairy almost nothing at all.  Equivalent tariffs, including
NTB tariff equivalents, would be reduced on average (unweighted) 36%, minimum
15% per tariff line. In practice the average reduction would near 15% since many
tariff lines are 0%.
42 Many pending points remained on details of the agreement
covering policies to be excluded from the agreement (the so-called green box), the
treatment of several government services provided to producers, of food aid
programmes and of specific direct payments to producers and their relation to support
of domestic production.
From the point of view of Brazilian agricultural imports there was great interest in the
combined effect of the legalization of subsidies which would follow from the
agreement between the US and the EC through the so-called peace clause, which
blocked temporarily the use of countervailing measures to parry the effect of export
subsidies on domestic agriculture. But Brazil’s ability to influence the outcome of this
essentially bilateral negotiation was, to put it lightly, extremely modest. Brazil which16
already preferred the Dunkel draft to the Round’s failure, would continue, faute de
mieux, to prefer the Blair House agreement to total failure of the GATT
negotiations.
43
Brazil participated regularly in the sectoral negotiations which took place in some
cases spasmodically in other negotiating groups . In services, the Brazilian offer
included land transportation, engineering and construction, consulting services,
accounting and franchising, in line with offers by other big developing countries.
44 In
the case of TRIPS, after mid-1990 and the visit of the USTR to Brazil, the Brazilian
stance became more flexible in relation to demands of the developed countries and
more concentrated in the specific negotiation of proposals to reform standards.
45
The final phase of the negotiations started in Geneva in 1993 and culminated in
Marrakesh in April 1994. It centered in the solution of difficulties between the EC and
the US concerning at first agriculture, then services. France had a crucial role in the
negotiations having great restrictions on the magnitude and the timing of agricultural
liberalization and insisting on restrictions to access to the European market for audio-
visual services. After the end of 1992 France made increasingly clear her reluctance to
accept the terms of the Blair House agreement. French estimates of surplus grain
production, based on different assumptions on the evolution of productivity, reached
15 million tons in 1994.
46 Passions were raised in France and opposition to both
agricultural liberalization, and liberalization of audiovisual services, because of its
impact on cultural identity, became the core of  the resistance to the proposed
agreement.
47 From the accommodation of these difficulties between the EC and the
US resulted a significant dilution in the agricultural trade liberalization agreed in Blair
House. The change in the base year for the computation of reduction of subsidies
made possible sizable additional subsidized exports of  grains by the EC and of grains
and oilseeds by the US.
  The peace clause was extended from six to nine years.
Tariffication could be postponed, provided there was an increase in the minimum
levels of access.
After the solution of the agricultural deadlock negotiations between the EC and the
US centered on services: audiovisual, financial and maritime and air transportation.
These issues were de facto excluded from the final agreement. This was a vindication17
of the forecast of the so-called hard-liners of the 1980’s, Brazil and India, about the
difficulties of including services in the general agreement.
48 Negotiations of two
issues with  a high potential to undermine the multilateral system were postponed.
The first was to make MFN conditional on minimum access in the agreement on
financial services.  The second was the exclusion of taxation from the understanding
on national treatment, that is the possibility of accepting tax discrimination between
national and foreign firms.
The overall average tariff cut on industrial products was of 32%: 38% in developed
economies and 25% in developing economies. As tariffs were much higher in
developing economies the impact on import costs was much more significant  than in
developed economies. Also, cuts in developed countries were deeper on imports from
other developed economies (40%) than on imports from developing economies (28%).
The average cut of tariffs in developed economies on tropical products was 43% (35%
on coffee, tea, cocoa and mate). But the cuts affecting some of the most important
Brazilian exports were lower as, for instance, orange juice whose tariffs were reduced
by 20% in the EC and 15% in the US and Japan.
49 Brazil, in line with other Latin
American countries but in contrast with Asia, bound all its tariff schedule: at 35% for
industrial products  and up to 55% for agricultural products. Before the Uruguay
Round only 23% of trade was in bound tariff lines and only 6% of the lines were
bound. Convergence to new bindings  was to take five years with yearly reduction
equivalent to one fifth of the difference between the initial tariff and the new bound
tariff level.
Estimates of the impact of the Uruguay Round on Brazil suggest that the static effect
would be in the region of 0.3%, similar to that of other Latin American economies and
many developed economies such as the US and much below the 2-3% range relevant
for many Asian economies. The inclusion of increasing returns of scale effects
increases this to only 0.4%. Only with dynamic effects this reaches 1%, compared to
0.7% for the world economy.
50
The MFA, which had been extended until the beginning of 1995, was to be
implemented in ten years. The share of trade included in stage 1 was raised from 12%
to 16%, but all the other characteristics mentioned in the Dunkel draft were18
maintained.  As the developed countries were successful in their efforts to expand the
list of products covered by the agreement but whose exports are not constrained by
the MFA at least during the first two stages of the process, no product subject to a
quota will be affected. All difficulties and the danger of backsliding are concentrated
in stage 3. 
51
In the case of AD, CVD and safeguards the final agreement followed the Dunkel draft
although the possibility that the panel overturned national decisions on AD was
severely curtailed by the fact that their work was to be restricted to the determination
of whether the establishment of facts by national authorities had been proper and their
evaluation unbiased and objective. In the case of safeguards, the possibility of
departing from quota determination based on past export performance, the so-called
quota modulation possibility, can potentially undermine the commitment to restrict
targeting of specific suppliers. It was agreed that negotiations on certain services
would continue after the conclusion of the round: financial services to be concluded in
July 1995; basic communications, civil aviation, maritime transportation and
audiovisual to be concluded by mid-1996. The final agreement embodied substantial
advance in relation to the institutional consolidation of the new World Trade
Organization in comparison with the fragile previous arrangement. Dispute settlement
machinery has been substantially improved. Given the structural lack of symmetrical
bargaining power between members, however, the remedy of retaliation is bound to
be inadequate for most, if not all, developing countries. The position is not improved
by the possibility of cross-retaliation as between different sectors and agreements, as
goods, services and TRIPS.  It was also decided that a Committee on Trade and
Environment should be created. This can be interpreted as a first move by some
members to widen still further the scope  of issues considered in the WTO.
It should also be mentioned that there was no formal and unambiguous understanding
in the Uruguay Round on the illegality of unilateral measures such as section 301 of
the US trade legislation. There are indications that the US government continues to
believe that the possibility of using section 301 stands in all circumstances in which
there is no legal undertaking to use multilateral remedies. This may be a source of
difficulty in view of the EC interpretation that the Uruguay Round results make it
illegal to apply such instruments. The issue of eventually using a newly created Euro19
301 type instrument in case of US insistence in the use of 301 is very divisive issue in
the European Union.
4. Brazil in the GATT, 1980-1994
The incidence of consultations and panels involving Brazil increased significantly in
the 1980’s.  Brazil was involved as a complainant : in a panel against Spain in 1980
on the new legislation on coffee
52; in new consultations in 1982, together with other
contracting parties, on EC sugar export subsidies; in consultations with the US on
ethyl alcohol; in consultations with the US in 1988 on the unfavourable impact of the
US  Export Enhancement Program on Brazilian exports; in a long dispute with the US
on subsidy countervailing duties which allegedly had been unduly collected in the
early 1980’s which was the object of two panels. The first in the Subsidies Committee
was lost by Brazil in 1989; the second, on discriminatory treatment was won in the
Council in 1992. The matter was finally disposed of  by US legislation following the
ratification of the Uruguay Round results.
53 In 1993 Brazil complained against the EC
on the imposition of duties because of alleged dumping of cotton yarn. This led to a
panel which found against Brazil. In 1993 Brazil also asked the conciliation of the
Anti-Dumping Committee on the tratment by Mexico of Brazilian exports of electric
power transformers as well as the good offices of the Director-general on exports of
wool suits too the United States. In both cases solutions were found without use of
conventional dispute settlement.
Complaints against Brazil in the 1980’s were mainly from the US: the dispute in 1983
on poultry exports was solved by a market sharing agreement also involving the EC;
the 1989 US complaint on the Brazil import licensing system became obsolete with
the reform of the Brazilian trade regime after March 1990. There was a complaint
against Brazil in 1992 by the EC due to Brazil’s imposition of subsidy countervailing
duty on imports of milk powder and other milk types. In 1994 the panel findings were
against Brazil and the duties were withdrawn.
Brazil complained twice to the GATT in relation to bilateral sanctions applied by the
US in the 1980’s. In 1987, the US brandished commercial sanctions to Brazilian
exports amounting to more than US$ 100 million in answer to alleged violations of20
the legislation on intellectual property and investment related to information
technology products. The sanction was withdrawn with the reversal of a Brazilian
decision on the sale of software in the domestic market. However, from Brazil’s point
of view, the most important bilateral dispute to be discussed in the GATT was the
Brazilian complaint on the US imposition of surtaxes of 100%   on Brazilian exports
of paper products, pharmaceuticals and electronic products in retaliation for the
alleged inadequate protection of pharmaceutical patents allowed by the Brazilian
legislation on intellectual property. Brazil requested a panel to examine the question
of principle involved, that is the conflict of the action by the US with the rules and
obligations defined by the GATT.
54 Although the US faced much criticism in the
GATT, since its decision had not been preceded by any attempt to solve the matter
according to the multilateral rules, the matter was only solved bilaterally by an
undertaking by the Brazilian government that the Executive would propose new
legislation to Congress that would be in line with US desiderata.
The notification of Mercosur to the GATT in 1992 led to frictions between developing
and developed economies in the GATT Council and in the Committee on Trade and
Development as Mercosur members insisted on the notification under the Enabling
Clause of the Framework Agreement which provides a permanent legal basis for
preferential trade agreements in favour of developing countries and not under Article
XXIV. This was strongly opposed mainly by the United States, which insisted in
notification under Article XXIV. The matter remains unresolved.
5. Brazil and the WTO after the Uruguay Round, 1994-1998
Unfinished business after the Uruguay Round included negotiations on basic
telecommunications, financial services and maritime transport. An agreement on basic
telecommunications was reached in February 1997 to enter into force in January 1998.
This covered voice telephony, data transmission, telex, telegraph, facsimile, private
leasing circuit services, fixed and mobile satellites systems and services, cellular
telephony, mobile data services, paging and personal communications systems.
Agreement was reached after protracted negotiations during which the US repeatedly
insisted that it would be unwilling to join unless offers by other participants were
improved. Similarly, an agreement of financial services was finally reached in the end21
of 1997, to enter into force in March 1999. The US had also in this case insisted that
until the end that access offers by other participants were insufficient but ended by
joining. Such difficulties had prevented the US from joining the 1995 interim
agreement. Negotiations on maritime transport became deadlocked and it was decided
in June 1996 that  they should be suspended until the year 2000 when comprehensive
negotiations seeking further
There were few substantive concessions in the Brazilian schedule of commitments
under GATS concerning financial services.
55 Limitations on market access and
national treatment were left unbound for most sectors and modes of supply. There is
no commitment on consumption abroad or cross-border supply of financial services.
Commercial presence requires discretionary executive authorization which may
impose constraints as, for instance, in branching. Reinsurance and work accident
insurance remain public monopolies with quite vague promises that commitments will
follow once relevant legislation is approved. The most substantive item in the
schedule is the assured presence of foreign persons in the privatization of public
sector financial institutions and that commercial presence will be granted to foreign
banks acquiring public banks.
The schedule of commitments on basic telecommunications offered more
concessions. Supply of value added services did not require specific governmental
licence. Licences are to be granted only to juridical persons constituted according to
Brazilian legislation.  Additional commitments as reflected in the General
Telecommunications Law covered competitive safeguards, interconnection, universal
service, public availability of licensing criteria, independent regulation and  allocation
and use of scarce resources. Limitations of 49% of voting capital on foreign capital in
satellite telecommunications (space segments facilities of satellites) is to lapse in July
1999.
In 1995-1998 Brazil was complainant in several panels. It participated with Venezuela
in the action on environmental standards related to gasoline against the US which was
reinstated in 1995 and led, after review being sought in the Appellate Body, to the US
agreeing to change its legislation to remove discriminatory distortions.
56 A panel
established in July 1997 at the request of Brazil to examine the importation of certain22
poultry products by the EC, in alleged breach of a Brazil-EC bilateral agreement,
found against Brazil and this was confirmed by the Appellate Body in July 1998. A
panel was established in July 1998 to examine a complaint by Brazil against Canada
on measures affecting the export of civilian aircraft. In 1998 Brazil was also involved
in a consultation with Peru on exports of buses.
Complaints against Brazil included the request by the Philippines in 1996 for a panel
on importation of  desiccated coconut which found for Brazil, a decision confirmed in
the Appellate Body in 1997. There is a panel examining since July 1998 the Brazilian
export financing programme at the request of Canada. Other consultations involving
complaints agains Brazil included those by Sri Lanka in 1996 on coconut, and by
Japan on automotive investment and by the EC on payment terms for imports, both in
1998.
In 1996, Brazil imposed a quota system on imports of automobiles and tried to obtain
a waiver to do so from the Balance of Payments Committee. As the Committee was
unable to accept that Brazil’s balance of payments position warranted such a policy,
the automotive regime of investment incentives was modified so that Brazil’s tariff
reduction commitments in the Uruguay Round remained unaffected although a tariff
quota  continued to discriminate between imports made by producers investing in
Brazil and imports from other suppliers which exceeded their quotas.
The main concrete result following the Singapore Conference at the end of 1996 was
the negotiation of an agreement on the trade of information technology goods. Forty
countries, answering for more than 90% of world trade in such goods, joined the
Information Technology Agreement and agreed to reduce to zero their tariffs on such
goods in four equal steps between July 1997 and January 2000. Brazil was not a
signatory.  Signaling issues to be included in the future agenda, the Singapore
conference also set up working groups on the relationship on trade and investment, on
the transparency in government procurement and on the interaction between trade and
competition policy. Finally, mention should be made to work in progress in the
Committee on Trade and Environment covering a wide mandate to examine links
between trade and environmental measures in order to promote sustainable23
development as well as  to make recommendations on possible modifications of the
WTO provisions with this aim in mind.
6. Brazilian diplomacy and the GATT
Brazil was a GATT founding father but its involvement up to the Tokyo Round was
really marginal. Brazilian stance in the UNCTAD in the 1960’s underlined the
importance of  stands of  principle in Brazilian foreign economic policy and also the
considerable autonomy of Itamaraty in the definition of such a policy. The reversal of
the timid trade liberalization of 1967 in the late 1960’s and the concentration of
interest in GSP preferences made it natural that Brazil continued aligned to the G-77
grand coalition of developing countries which had taken shape in New Delhi in the
first UNCTAD conference in 1964.
The Tokyo Round marked a revision of the traditional US policy of support of the
multilateral trading system based on the unconditional application of the MFN clause.
Emphasis was increasingly placed on reciprocity and criticism to the position of free
riders, especially by some of the larger developing countries, protected by special and
differential treatment  clauses. The idea of limiting the scope of the MFN clause,
making it conditional on minimum threshold of concessions, gained strength. This
reversal of the traditional US foreign economic policy since 1934 would be crowned
by the belated conversion of the US to the advantages of regionalism, which resulted
in NAFTA and the enthusiasm about the FTAA. This was an answer partly to the
deepening and widening of the European process of integration, and partly to the
perceived competition menace from Asia. In this context of changes in the US foreign
economic policy, bilateral frictions with countries such as Brazil, large and relatively
less poor than the average developing economy, and with an active foreign policy,
became frequent. 
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The increasing difficulties faced in 1970’s by industrial exports of developing
countries to have access to the US market and the growing involvement of
governments in financial negotiations related to the debt problem after 1979, made
interdepartmental coordination of decisions concerning foreign economic policies
more complex> It also eroded Brazil’s bargaining power. The economic ministries24
were more reluctant to leave policy formulation and implementation essentially to
professional diplomats. This is  well illustrated by the almost open conflict between
Itamaraty and the ministries of Finance and/or Planning on Brazil’s signature of the
Subsidies Code in 1979 and also on the terms of the GATT Ministerial Declaration of
1982 on the agenda for the next round.
The more conventional interpretation to explain the Brazilian stance in the GATT, at
least until 1987, of resistance to the inclusion of new issues in the agenda, and
insistence in the importance of the backlog, is that this was a natural consequence of
Brazil’s foreign policy growing convergence with the G-77 group of developing
economies which took form in the UNCTAD. This process had started in the early
1960’s and had been only temporarily affected by the military coup of 1964 and
temporarily closer political ties with the US in the second half of the 1960’s. The
concrete economic interests which could have justified such a policy  were rapidly
disappearing as Brazil’s productive structure and export changed.  Exports of
industrial products increased their share in total exports from 4% to around 50% in the
end of the 1970’s. The fragmentation of the interests of developing economies after
the beginning of the 1960’s was a natural consequence of the differentiation of their
export structure. A developing economy was necessarily an exporter of primary
commodities until the 1960’s but this ceased to be true in the 1970’s.   Moreover, it
became increasingly clear that even in relation to traditional issues, such as textiles
and clothing and agriculture, interests could be clearly antagonistic. Interests were
different also in relation to tariff preferences and market access for manufactures in
the developed economies.
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 Thus, coalitions based on the convergence of concrete
interests such as that in the case of services tended to represent only a small subset of
developing countries.
A perhaps more convincing alternative explanation for the Brazilian initial stance
concerning the Round was that this policy resulted from the conclusion that Brazil
indeed had different interest when compared to other developing economies. That the
G-10 was in fact a G-2, that is an alliance with India, based on concrete interests of
both countries. There was an obvious interest for the Brazil-India coalition to exploit
the differences between developed countries and block or slow down the advance of
negotiations on the new issues. This strategy was relatively successful until Punta del25
Este in face of the differences between the US and the EC in relation to agriculture.
But after Punta del Este it was impossible to maintain the initial position, given the
increasing pressure from the developed economies, especially the US, and the
weakening stance of the G-2, and particularly of Brazil.  Although there was an
attempt to present the Punta del Este results as a compromise and a relative success of
Brazilian diplomacy, it would seem retrospectively that the main result of the
Brazilian efforts was a face saving solution which rationalized the stance taken in the
years preceding the launching of negotiations. The attempt to limit damage by the
device of trying to block cross concessions involving goods and services by dividing
the negotiations in two tracks simply did not work.
59
There is no doubt that the Brazilian bargaining position was weakened by the
country’s growing financial vulnerability since the end of the 1970’s.  But it is also
clear that the economic stagnation which started in 1981 and was to last until well into
the 1990’s, following a long period of high growth with protection which had started
in the end of last century, stimulated a re-examination of the net advantages of the
continued adoption of an import substitution model. It became also increasingly clear
that an industrial development strategy based on “picking the winners” was generating
substantial friction with suppliers, especially the US, without significant benefits in a
situation of increasing loss of credibility related to the persistent macroeconomic
disequilibria, especially high inflation. The bargaining power of  developing countries
was also undermined by the end of the bipolar world with the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
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Brazilian policy in the GATT in the first half of the 1980’s was a natural consequence
of an economic strategy which had its roots in the last spurt of import substitution
industrialization in the 1970’s. This was a natural policy in a country where ideas
linking rapid growth and high protection were firmly tied in hearts and minds. With
the fragility entailed by the continued adoption of such economic strategy becoming
increasingly evident, however, it was to be expected that this was reflected in
Brazilian foreign economic policy even with such a protectionist inertia.
Given its stance in the early stages of the negotiations on the new issues it is not
surprising that Brazil was reticent in the initial moves leading to the formation of the26
Cairns group, as it would be difficult to conciliate active profiles as a foot dragger
concerning the new issues and as a demandeur in agriculture. There were two
strategies in conflict after Punta del Este and between 1986 and 1988 there was a
gradual substitution of previous commitment to block the new issues negotiations to a
more active role concerning agriculture.
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The inclusion of the new issues in the Uruguay Round stimulated the adoption of a
more active Brazilian agenda. The reorientation of the Brazilian stance was already
clear in Montreal with both a more flexible stance on the new issues, especially
TRIPS,  and a consequent convergence with the US position, via Cairns, on
agricultural liberalization. So interest was focused on an issue which was important in
the historical GATT backlog, in which Brazil had a concrete interest as a demandeur
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and deemed as crucial by Argentina, a country which was tending to become a
priority from the point of view of Brazilian foreign policy.
 63
After March 1990 the new government adopted a comprehensive programme of
liberal reform, including the deepening of tariff cuts. The average tariff rate which had
already been reduced from more than 50% in 1987 to 32.2% in 1990 was scheduled to
be further reduced unilaterally to 14.2% by the beginning of 1994. This was
afterwards anticipated to mid-1993.
64 Non-tariff trade barriers, and specially import
prohibitions which had been effective at least from the early 1970’s were abolished.
The removal of bilateral sources of friction with the United States became a priority in
a situation marked by a comprehensive effort to regain credibility which included also
efforts on deregulation, privatization and price stabilization. Although the stabilization
efforts failed and President Collor impeached in 1993 for corrupt practices, trade
liberalization had come to stay. It was expected that lower protection would make
stabilization easier, would contribute to increase competitiveness of domestic industry
and that bilateral and multilateral good behaviour concerning commercial policy
matters could improve the chances of reaching a reasonable settlement in the
protracted foreign debt negotiations.    
The preliminary evaluation of the new foreign economic policy would appear
to suggest evidence of an unduly automatic support of the policies promoted by the
US,  without great preoccupation with reciprocity, even taking into account the27
asymmetry in the bargaining power of the two countries. One could even think of
unrewarded good behaviour. But is it reasonable to evaluate foreign economic policy
without taking into account the global picture related to the stabilization programme
and the restructuring of the economy? It is unlikely that such a critical stand would
subsist if the stabilization attempt had been successful. Later, with the failure of the
stabilization programme and further erosion of political credibility, when it was
impossible to hide the dark side of the government which there to be seen from its
beginning, the possibly excessive enthusiasm in falling in line à outrance with the US
was easier to detect. In any case, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the
shift in traditionally protectionist trade policies after 1990 which on the whole has
been preserved to date.
The Brussels 1990 meeting marked the consolidation of Brazil’s transition to a
positive agenda in the negotiations. Once again it had an active role  in the negotiation
of agricultural trade liberalization.
65 The failure of Brussels, which had been planned
as the final meeting of the round, had the advantage of providing more time to allow
for the shift in Brazilian policy towards a substantive discussion of the agenda.
Criticisms of this shift have emphasized the subordinate position of Brazil  in relation
to the US. In the core of the criticism is the nature of the relations between the Cairns
coalition, the US and the EC. There is no doubt that convergence between Cairns and
the US was a vital factor for the limited success of those in favour of  trade
liberalization in agriculture. Once the divergences were concentrated on agriculture,
the US-Cairns rapprochement was inevitable. Moreover, in contrast with 1986, the
EC was in the defensive and unable to make any concession that could make some of
the members of Cairns less sanguine.
66 The reversal of this situation, with the clear
victory of French diplomacy in the final stages of the negotiations in 1993, weakening
the commitments to agricultural trade liberalization and blocking the negotiations of
some services, did not have significant implications on the evaluation of Brazilian
policy in the GATT in 1990-1993.
It is difficult to see which alternative policies could have been adopted by Brazil. The
loss of credibility in the 1980’s and early 1990’s drastically reduced the degrees of
freedom to define and implement foreign economic policies. The scope for choice
imagined by those who criticized the policies because they were based on28
“conformism with constrained development”, or because they were those of a "second
class power", or based on ideas of a "conceptually 'small Brazil' ", simply did not
exist.
67 It was exactly because Brazil in the 1970’s attempted rather ineptly to cease to
be a second class power, based on projects defined in a centralized and defective
decision-making process centered around the idea of a "Brasil grande", that the
country faced a crisis in which it lost its credibility, ceased to grow and weakened its
bargaining power.
With the introduction of the Real stabilization plan in 1994 commercial policy
became vulnerable to pressures related or allegedly related to the level of the real
exchange rate. In October 1994, to counter the appreciation of the Real and the rise in
domestic prices tariffs on automobiles were reduced to 20%. With the Mexican crisis
at the end of the year the position was radically reversed as capital movements
became temporarily unfavourable. Tariffs on imports of automobiles were increased
to 70% and import quotas established in the context of a so-called automotive regime
which offered generous fiscal (including tariff) rebates to firms investing in Brazil.
This was an essentially mercantilist regime based on rudimentary targets of alleged
balance of payments neutrality and heavily relying on export performance criteria.
The quotas were substituted, after the unfavourable reaction by the WTO Committee
on Balance of Payments, already mentioned, by a tariff quota which at least respected
the bound maximum tariff schedule included in the Brazilian schedule in the Uruguay
Round. Other piecemeal reversals of liberalization occurred in the shape of frequent
and erratic adjustments of tariffs on capital goods, the use of safeguards on textiles,
electronic consumer goods and toys, and restrictions to terms of financing of
imports.
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In the WTO the Brazilian stance can be described as defensive as the main objective
was to digest the significant trade liberalization efforts entailed  by the Uruguay
Round commitments, by negotiation of the Mercosur’s external tariff and unilateral
liberalization since 1987.
69 A demonstration of such cautious policy was the refusal to
join the Information Technology Agreement. Although Brazil’s lack of interest in the
ITA was mainly explained by the “take it or leave it” nature of the proposal by the
developed economies.
70 There is an important additional reason which is that all29
piecemeal sectoral liberalization initiatives such as ITA end up by undermining the re-
examination by the WTO of traditional issues and particularly agriculture.
7. Perspectives
The recent crisis in Brazil is not likely to have permanent effects on which should be
Brazil’s objectives in the WTO and on the expectations of other WTO members on
Brazilian policies in the WTO. Even if it is certain that Brazil’s bargaining power and
influence will be again temporarily undermined by its the financial fragility. The
times of high growth combined with high protection will not return. They were
possible because of market power in the coffee market or, more recently, because
Brazil’s competitor’s also adopted protectionist policies. It continues to be difficult to
find credible arguments which refute that the foreign economic policy which best
serves the overall interests of the Brazilian population is based on the continuous
adoption of liberal commercial policies which increase the efficiency of domestic
production and/or put a ceiling to the high profits generated by the market power of
oligopolies.
Brazil, as a big developing country, has a great interest in a multilateral trading
system that assures access to its exports in all markets. It is among the WTO members
with more diversified interests in different negotiating groups. This is a result of its
size, geography, availability of natural resources, climatic diversity  and geographical
diversification of its trade. In normal macroeconomic conditions it has pursued, or
could pursue, a wide range of objectives in its commercial policy beyond participation
in the multilateral fora: deepening of sub-regional integration within Mercosur,
widening sub-regional initiatives to include more members in South America and
perhaps also in the South Atlantic, entering preferential arrangements in the
hemisphere or with selected partners such as the EC. But its first best commercial
policy objective remains multilateral liberalization.
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What is wanted from Brazil by its partners at the WTO is also a continuous
commitment to an open market policy. But it is, of course, not easy to make
compatible the domestic political economy of protection of different WTO members
with continuous trade liberalization. The role of the WTO and of multilateral30
disciplines is likely to be more important for countries such as Brazil, with a limited
bargaining power, than for big economies or trading blocs such as the US, the EC and
Japan. In principle, size is more likely to be efficiently exploited in bilateral
negotiations by major players than in the WTO. Also, the greater is Brazil’s
commitment to multilateral disciplines, the more important will be its role in the
WTO and its ability to influence rule-making and assure a fair use of dispute
settlement mechanisms.
It important, however, to have in mind that there are is not much scope for substantial
concessions to be made by Brazil in a new round of multilateral negotiations. Tariff
cuts in the Uruguay Round were much more significant on industrial products than on
agricultural products. Cuts in industrial tariffs were higher in developing country
markets than in developed countries. It is to be expected that developing countries
would press for a pace of agricultural liberalization and on textiles considerably
brisker than that for  industrial products in which developed countries are most
interested. Widening the scope of issues negotiated in the WTO is also a field which
is likely to be marked by many difficulties. Both  environment and  labour standards
are issues in which Brazil is sure to have interests which would tend to diverge from
those of most major players.
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by developed countries in relation to issues such as agriculture (EC) or certain services (US).
49 See Abreu (1996) for the contrasts in tariff cuts in different markets for different groups of suppliers.
50 See Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1996). This article also includes a discussion of other results and
explanations for discrepancies. See, for an earlier attempt, Goldin, Knudsen  and  van der Mensbrugghe
(1993). The criticisms of Allais  (1993) to the computable general equilibrium approach were, to large
extent, answered, by  Waelbroeck (1993).
51 See Raffaelli (1992), pp. 32-33 and Abreu (1996), pp. 68-72.
52  Spain had subdivided its coffee classification and applied a higher tariff on types of coffee imported
from Brazil. The panel’s  ruling was that all coffees were “like products”. See Jackson (1997), p. 163.
53 Information included in the following paragraphs is from GATT, Activities, several years.
54 See intervention by the Brazilian Ambassador, Rubens Ricupero, in the GATT Council, 22.9.1988.
55 This follows Bevilaqua and Loyo (1998). The schedule of commitments is in GATS/SC/13/Suppl. 3,
26.2.98.
56 See WTO Annual Report, several years.
57  See Abreu (1995), section 1.
58  See Abreu (1989).
59  See "Aposta em consenso no GATT", Gazeta Mercantil, 30.8.85 on what was expected by Brazilian
diplomats to result from the segregation of negotiations. This position changed drastically: see, for
instance,  "País define táticas de atuação nas negociações da Rodada Uruguai", Gazeta Mercantil,
25.10.90, which reports the admission that cross concessions were indeed to be welcomed. In 1993 in
Geneva Brazil unsuccessfully offered to the US improved access to the Brazilian market for financial
and telecommunications services in exchange for increased access for exports of orange juice, textiles,
footwear, pottery and capital goods, see "GATT: Pressão do Brasil", Gazeta Mercantil, 10.12.93 .
60  See Abdenur (1992), pp. 15-16.
61  Oxley (1990),  p.112, mentions the initial Brazilian reluctance on joining the initial core of the
Cairns group (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand and Uruguay) and its insistence that the
objective should be to coordinate positions rather than agree on a joint position.  Brazilian agreement
with the first Cairns proposal in 1987 required a previous assurance by Australia that provisions on
special and differential treatment for developing countries would be preserved in the liberalization
process.
62  See Ricupero (1993), p.30.
63  At least initially mainly for political reasons.
64 See GATT, Trade Policy Review. Brazil 1992, Geneva.
65 See Ricupero (1993), p. 30.
66 According to others, however, in Brussels, Brazil fell in line with the US, in particular in the
agricultural controversy with the EC, “in which we have no great interest  [and] we would end up by
acting as supporting cast for the US delegation, playing the role of mouthpiece of procedural moves
against the EC generally reserved to countries of secondary importance or with limited interests at
stake.”,  Batista (1993), pp. 114-115.
67 See Batista (1993), p.120.33
                                                                                                                                                              
68 This is also reflected in the increase in the average tariff since 1995 as shown by the data collected
by the Secretaria de Receita Federal. Average ad valorem nominal tariffs increased from 13.6% in 1996
to 16.7% in the first semester of 1998, Gazeta Mercantil, 10.9.98.
69 See, for instance, Minister Lampreia’s speech in the Escola Superior de Guerra, ‘País evitará
“exposição precoce”de sua economia’, Gazeta Mercantil, 4.7.96.
70 See,’Pais sem interesse em aderir ao ITA’, Gazeta Mercantil, 10.1.97 and ‘Brasil recebe crítica por
ficar fora do ITA’, Gazeta Mercantil, 29.4.97.
71 See Abreu and Fritsch (1992) and Lafer (1993).34
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